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_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
In November 2011, Jose Pedro Verde-Rodriguez 
(“Verde”) filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
challenging his removal from the United States.  The District 
Court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
the petition and transferred the case to this Court.  We will 
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 
According to his habeas petition, Verde is a native of 
Mexico and became a lawful permanent resident of the 
United States in 1991.  After several convictions for driving 
under the influence of alcohol (the “DUI convictions”), Verde 
was sentenced to two years and four months in state prison.  
In October 1998, Verde was charged with removability based 
on his status as an “aggravated felon” due to the DUI 
convictions.  He appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
with seven other Mexican nationals, and the IJ ordered 
Verde’s removal on October 28, 1998.  Verde returned to the 
United States, but was removed to Mexico for a second time 
in 2000.  He was found in the United States once again in 
October 2011.  Verde was served with a “Notice of 
Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order” on October 24, 
2011, reinstating his 1998 removal order.  This time, he was 
also charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326.  The 
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United States eventually dropped the § 1326 charge and 
allowed him to plead guilty to use of a false Social Security 
number in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B).  He was 
sentenced to time served and a one-year term of supervised 
release. 
 
Verde filed a habeas petition seeking to be reinstated 
to his status as a U.S. permanent resident or to be granted 
cancellation of removal.  His principal argument was that his 
initial removal was a gross miscarriage of justice because of 
procedural shortcomings that occurred during his 1998 
removal hearing.  He also asserted that because the Supreme 
Court later decided that a DUI conviction was not an 
aggravated felony, his conviction was not a valid basis for his 
original removal.   
 
The District Court dismissed Verde’s petition for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  It explained that the REAL ID 
Act of 2005 “‘eliminated the availability of habeas corpus 
relief in the district courts for aliens seeking to challenge 
orders of removal.’”  Appendix (“App.”) 6 (quoting 
Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 501 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 
2007)).  The District Court then provided two reasons for 
transferring the case to this Court.  First, it concluded that 
“jurisdiction would have been proper in the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at the time petitioner’s habeas petition 
was filed.”  App. 8.  Second, the court noted that it had 
“serious concerns regarding whether the REAL ID Act should 
be construed as eliminating collateral review of deportation 
orders which were entered prior to the enactment of the 
REAL ID Act, but which could not have been challenged by 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus until the detention of a 
petitioner years later.”  App. 9.   
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II. 
 
We first consider whether we have jurisdiction.  
Application of the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., is 
central to the resolution of this threshold issue.  The REAL 
ID Act fundamentally altered the manner in which aliens may 
seek review of orders of removal.  The law eliminated habeas 
corpus review over removal orders and provides that “a 
petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals 
in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive 
means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or 
issued under any provision of this chapter.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(5).
1
  A petition for review must be filed within thirty 
days of the final removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).  Based 
on this requirement, the Government argues that Verde’s 
current petition for removal is untimely:  while it was filed 
within thirty days of the most recent reinstatement of the 
order, the Government maintains that the thirty-day window 
is not renewed when a removal order is reinstated.  
Importantly, we have no jurisdiction over an untimely 
petition.  See Kolkevich, 501 F.3d 323, 337.
 2
 
A. 
 
                                                 
1
 The statute contains an exception for review of some orders not 
relevant here. 
2
 In addition to the thirty-day deadline, § 1252 also prevents review 
of a final order of removal unless “the alien has exhausted all 
administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  Because the Government’s brief focuses on 
the thirty-day deadline and we decide the case on this jurisdictional 
basis, we will not address whether Verde properly exhausted his 
administrative remedies. 
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The parties first dispute whether the thirty-day time 
limit is altered by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), which provides 
that  
 
[n]othing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any 
other provision of this chapter (other than this 
section) which limits or eliminates judicial 
review, shall be construed as precluding review 
of constitutional claims or questions of law 
raised upon a petition for review filed with an 
appropriate court of appeals in accordance with 
this section. 
 
Verde essentially argues that this is a freestanding grant of 
jurisdiction that eliminates the thirty-day time limit for 
constitutional claims or questions of law.  But as the 
Government points out, § 1252(a)(2)(D) clearly limits its 
scope to subparagraph (B) or (C) or any other provision of the 
chapter “other than this section.”  Because § 1252(b)(1) is in 
§ 1252, but is not in subparagraph (B) or (C) of § 1252(a), § 
1252(a)(2)(D) cannot logically be read to eliminate the thirty-
day window for filing constitutional claims and questions of 
law.  Our past interpretation confirms this conclusion.  See 
Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“Congress has provided that nothing in 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(B), (C), or any other provision of the INA shall 
preclude judicial review of such orders, unless such review is 
barred by some other provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252.”).  
Accordingly, the thirty-day time limit set forth in § 
1252(b)(1) is not altered by § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
 
B. 
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Verde next asserts that his petition was timely because 
he filed it within thirty days of the 2011 reinstatement of his 
removal order.  He argues that under Debeato v. Attorney 
General, 505 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2007), an alien who has been 
removed may challenge a reinstated removal order in the 
same manner he would challenge the original order.  In 
Debeato, the petitioner came to the United States in 1988 and 
was arrested on drug charges two years later.  After serving 
prison time, she was deported because an IJ and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) agreed that she was an 
aggravated felon.  Id. at 233.  She left the United States in 
1998, but was found in the country again in 2000.  She pled 
guilty to illegal reentry and went to prison again; while in 
prison, her original deportation order was reinstated.  In 2003, 
Debeato filed a habeas petition arguing that the IJ erred in her 
original deportation proceedings by determining that she was 
ineligible for a waiver of deportation.  In determining our 
jurisdiction, we reviewed the REAL ID Act, citing 
Papageorgiou for the proposition that § 1252(a)(2)(D) 
removed all jurisdictional bars to review of constitutional 
claims and questions of law except for those limitations in § 
1252 itself.  Id. at 234.  Most importantly, we then addressed 
the question of how the holding in Papageorgiou applied to 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), which provides that when a removal 
order is reinstated from its original date, the alien is not 
eligible to apply for any relief under the chapter.  We relied 
on Ramirez-Molina v. Ziglar, 436 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2006), 
explaining that § 1231(a)(5) was overridden by § 
1252(a)(2)(D), and consequently that we retained jurisdiction 
over Debeato’s petition.  Debeato, 505 F.3d at 234-35 
(“[T]here is no principled reason for reading § 1252(a)(2)(D) 
as permitting jurisdiction to review a final removal order, yet 
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denying jurisdiction to review a reinstatement of that very 
same order.”). 
 
While Debeato makes clear that § 1252(a)(2)(D) 
overrides § 1231(a)(5), that conclusion does not lend much 
assistance to our resolution of the question at hand.
3
  This is 
because, as the Government points out, neither Debeato nor 
Ramirez-Molina addressed the thirty-day time limit of § 
1252(b)(1).  Both of those cases involved habeas petitions 
that were filed before the existence of a thirty-day limit and 
were converted to petitions for review due to the intervening 
passage of the REAL ID Act.  Further, § 1231(a)(5) is in a 
different section of Title 8, Chapter 12 — as noted above, § 
1252(a)(2)(D) overrides other sections of Title 8, Chapter 12, 
as well as subparagraphs (B) and (C) of subsection § 
1252(a)(2), but does not override other provisions contained 
in § 1252.  Thus, while § 1231(a)(5) should not prevent our 
review of the constitutional or statutory questions concerning 
a reinstated removal order in general, the case law relied upon 
by Verde does not make clear whether the thirty-day time 
limit can be circumvented by seeking review of the merits of 
an underlying removal order by filing a petition for review 
within thirty days of the issuance of a reinstated order.   
 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit answered 
the question we face today in Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 659 
F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. 2011).  There, an alien was removed in 
2005, but DHS issued a reinstated removal order when she 
                                                 
3
 Likewise, our statement that “an order reinstating a prior removal 
order is the functional equivalent of a final order of removal,” 
Dinnall v. Gonzales 421 F.3d 247, 251 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quotation marks omitted), was made in a different context and 
does not control our decision today.   
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was found in the United States again in 2010.  The petitioner 
made the same argument Verde makes here:  that § 
1252(a)(2)(D) overrides the jurisdictional bar contained in § 
1231(a)(5).  The Court agreed with that as a general matter, 
but then cited § 1252(b)(1)’s thirty-day time limit.  The Court 
easily concluded that “because Ms. Cordova-Soto failed to 
file her petition for review within thirty days of her 2005 
removal order, we lack jurisdiction to review that order, 
including constitutional claims or questions of law.”  Id. at 
1032; see also Avila v. United States Att’y Gen., 560 F.3d 
1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because Avila failed to exhaust 
his administrative remedies or seek timely review of his 1997 
deportation order, we lack jurisdiction to review the 
underlying validity of that order.”). 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit and hold that filing a petition for review within thirty 
days of a reinstated order of removal does not fulfill the 
requirements of § 1252(b)(1).  We also note that accepting 
Verde’s argument here would defeat the purpose of the 
statute’s time bar by allowing a challenge to an underlying 
removal order any time a reinstated order is issued.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit discussed this concern 
in Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 
2007).  In that case, the petitioner challenged the 
reinstatement of a removal order by arguing that the original 
removal proceeding did not provide due process.  The Court 
refused to review the original proceeding, noting that the 
reinstatement order imposed no penalties and did not create 
any obstacles to attacking the original order.  It went on to 
explain that  
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[t]he contrary conclusion would create a new 
and wholly unwarranted incentive for aliens 
who have previously been removed to reenter 
the country illegally in order to take advantage 
of this self-help remedy.  It would also make a 
mockery of aliens who do respect our laws and 
wait patiently outside our borders seeking 
lawful admission.   
 
Id. at 498.   
 
As a result, Verde’s filing of his appeal within thirty 
days after reinstatement of his removal order does not render 
his petition timely. 
 
C. 
 
 The District Court’s opinion explained that the case 
should be transferred to this Court in part because it 
“harbor[ed] serious concerns regarding whether [the REAL 
ID Act] should be construed as eliminating collateral review 
of deportation orders which were entered prior to the 
enactment of [the REAL ID Act], but which could not have 
been challenged by petition for a writ of habeas corpus until 
the detention of a petitioner years later.”  App. 9.  Its decision 
was based principally on Kolkevich, 501 F.3d 323.  
 
 In Kolkevich, a Russian national who was a lawful 
permanent resident was convicted and incarcerated on 
charges of robbery and assault.  Kolkevich conceded 
removability, but sought relief under the Convention Against 
Torture.  An IJ granted him relief, but the BIA reversed.  That 
decision was made in March 2005, fifty-one days before 
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President Bush signed the REAL ID Act.  Therefore, when 
the BIA’s order was issued, Kolkevich’s only option for 
challenging its decision was a habeas petition, “which could 
have been filed at any time, without limit, following issuance 
of the order of removal.”  Id. at 325.  Kolkevich did nothing 
until filing a habeas petition in April 2006.  Our opinion 
explained that the REAL ID Act was silent concerning aliens 
who were entitled to file habeas petitions after their removal 
orders, but did not do so before the REAL ID Act was 
enacted.  Id. at 329.  We reviewed the case to determine 
whether Kolkevich should receive extra time to file his 
petition due to the change in law that occurred.   
 
 We began our analysis with a discussion of the 
Suspension Clause, which provides that the writ of habeas 
corpus shall not be suspended unless necessary for public 
safety.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  Our case law establishes 
that the clause requires at least some judicial review of 
deportation cases, and also that the REAL ID Act’s 
limitations on the petition right are constitutional.  Kolkevich, 
501 F.3d at 332 (quotation marks omitted).  We first 
concluded that we could not read the REAL ID Act in the 
fashion the Government urged — it asked us to conclude that 
the day before the REAL ID Act’s passage, Kolkevich had an 
unlimited right to file a habeas petition, but on the day the 
REAL ID Act was passed he suddenly had no access to the 
courts.  Id. at 334-35.  To avoid invalidating the statute, we 
held that those in Kolkevich’s situation would be granted 
thirty days after the passage of the REAL ID Act (until June 
11, 2005) to file a petition for review.  Because Kolkevich 
had waited almost a year after the REAL ID Act’s passage, 
we concluded we lacked jurisdiction to review his claim.  Id. 
at 337. 
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 The District Court appears to have relied on Kolkevich 
to determine that we have jurisdiction because it believed that 
otherwise Verde would have been precluded from obtaining 
any review of the 1998 removal order.  Yet neither the 
District Court nor Verde has explained why Verde could not 
have filed a petition for review within the thirty days 
following the enactment of the REAL ID Act.
4
  Like 
Kolkevich, Verde failed to file suit within the thirty-day 
window after the REAL ID Act’s enactment, and 
consequently, just as in Kolkevich, we conclude that the 
Suspension Clause does not necessitate exercising jurisdiction 
here.
5
 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
                                                 
4
 The District Court correctly explained that in order to file a 
petition for habeas relief, the petitioner must be in custody.  App. 
9; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1).  Yet it pointed to no such 
requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1252, nor did Verde identify any other 
obstacle to filing a petition for review.  See Jordon v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 424 F.3d 320, 328 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that because 
petitioner’s habeas petition was converted to a petition for review 
under the REAL ID Act, “whether Jordon was ‘in custody’ under 
§2241[] is a jurisdictional inquiry no longer relevant to our 
analysis here”). 
5
 Verde also contends that the Government waived its argument 
that the District Court improperly relied on Kolkevich because it 
failed to appeal the District Court’s discretionary transfer decision.  
Verde’s argument fails for several reasons, principally because we 
must accurately discern our own subject matter jurisdiction 
regardless of whether the issue was raised in the District Court.  
See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[D]efects 
in subject-matter jurisdiction require correction regardless of 
whether the error was raised in district court.”). 
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 Because Verde did not comply with the thirty-day 
deadline, we have no jurisdiction to review his petition under 
§ 1252. 
 
III. 
 
 Verde argues that even if we conclude that we have no 
jurisdiction under § 1252, we can assert jurisdiction over his 
habeas petition because he does not directly challenge an 
order of removal;
6
 instead, he argues that the immigration 
hearing leading to his removal was procedurally flawed.
7
  The 
District Court concluded that it had no habeas jurisdiction, 
though Verde claims that the court came to that conclusion 
only because it separately determined that § 1252 jurisdiction 
was proper under Kolkevich.   
 
 Because we have held that § 1252(a)(5) does not bar a 
habeas petition when a petitioner challenges something other 
than an order of removal, Kumarasamy v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
453 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2006), we must now decide 
whether a challenge to the procedure of a removal hearing 
qualifies as a challenge to the removal order.  In 
                                                 
6
 Section 1252 only governs review of orders of removal, and a 
petition for review is the exclusive means of review “of an order of 
removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, 
except as provided in subsection (e) of this section.”  § 1252(a)(5). 
7
 Verde complains that he was subjected to a group hearing, that 
the IJ’s language indicated that his appeal would be unsuccessful, 
that he was not properly informed of the availability of pro bono 
counsel, and that “the hearing proceeded under on [sic] the basis of 
the false premise that DUI indisputably was an aggravated felony.”  
Verde Br. 34. 
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Kumarasamy, the petitioner argued that he was improperly 
deported because no removal order was ever entered in his 
case.  Id.  We agreed that the REAL ID Act did not apply, but 
found we had no jurisdiction because Kumarasamy was not in 
custody when he filed his habeas petition.  Id. at 173.   
 
In Nnadika v. Attorney General, 484 F.3d 626, 633 (3d 
Cir. 2007), we held that the REAL ID Act did not apply when 
the petitioner challenged the Government’s adjudication and 
rules concerning asylee relative petitions even though the 
denial of relief would result in deportation.  While the facts in 
Nnadika make it easily distinguishable from the instant case, 
our discussion in that case is relevant to the question we face 
today.  The Nnadika Court made several references to Haider 
v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 902, 910 (8th Cir. 2006), a case in 
which the petitioner was ordered removed in absentia.  Haider 
filed a habeas petition in district court claiming that his due 
process rights were violated because he was not served with a 
valid notice to appear prior to his removal hearing.  Id. at 905.  
The district court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit because the petition “challenged a final 
order of removal.”  Id. at 906.  The Court of Appeals 
consolidated the habeas petition with a preexisting petition 
for review and agreed with the district court, concluding that 
“Haider’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus does nothing 
more than attack the IJ’s removal order.”  Id. at 910.  After 
recounting the holding in Haider, the Nnadika Court 
expressed its approval by explaining that “only challenges 
that directly implicate the order of removal, such as the 
challenge to the notice of the removal hearing in Haider, are 
properly the subject of transfer under the REAL ID Act.”  484 
F.3d at 632; see also Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 979 
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that term “order of removal” does not 
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include alien’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
concerning attorney’s actions taken after order of removal 
becomes final). 
 
While this Court has not previously addressed Verde’s 
argument, our decision in Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 
442 (3d Cir. 2005), treated a procedural due process claim as 
part of a request for review of a final order of removal.  In 
Bonhometre, the petitioner filed a habeas petition in 2003 
arguing that his previous removal order was invalid because 
the IJ failed to advise him of certain forms of potential relief.  
Id. at 445.  The case was decided after the REAL ID Act was 
passed, so we converted the habeas petition into a petition for 
review.  Id. at 446.  Beginning our analysis, we explained that 
we would “address the procedural due process claims raised 
by Mr. Bonhometre in his opening brief to the District Court 
as if they were raised in a petition for review before us in the 
first instance.”  Id.  Thus, Bonhometre reflects a view that 
procedural due process claims arising from a removal hearing 
are properly contained in a petition for review.   
 
Our conclusion in Bonhometre is in accord with 
Supreme Court cases that have afforded a broad definition to 
terms similar to “order of removal.”  In Foti v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 217, 221 (1963), the Court 
held that the term “final orders of deportation” included 
denials of suspension of deportation.  The Court explained 
that “all determinations made during and incident to the 
administrative proceeding . . . reviewable together by the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, such as orders denying 
voluntary departure pursuant to § 244(e) [8 U.S.C. § 1254(e)] 
and orders denying the withholding of deportation under § 
243(h) [8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)], are likewise included within the 
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ambit” of the term.  Id. at 229.  In part, this was because the 
“fundamental purpose behind [the law] was to abbreviate the 
process of judicial review of deportation orders in order to 
frustrate certain practices which had come to the attention of 
Congress, whereby persons subject to deportation were 
forestalling departure by dilatory tactics in the courts.”  Id. at 
224. 
 
The Court came to a similar conclusion in Immigration 
& Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  In 
that case, the petitioner’s deportation was suspended by an IJ, 
but the House of Representatives passed a resolution stating 
that the deportation should not be suspended.  Id. at 926.  An 
IJ then reopened the proceedings to implement the resolution, 
and Chadha sought a ruling that the provision of the law 
allowing the House resolution was unconstitutional.  Id. at 
928.  Chadha filed a petition for review with the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which “held that the House was 
without constitutional authority to order Chadha’s 
deportation.”  Id.   
 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was limited to 
review “of all final orders of deportation.”  Id. at 937 
(quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court held that the 
term encompassed Chadha’s situation and that “the term 
‘final orders’ in § 106(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)] includes all 
matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, 
rather than only those determinations actually made at the 
hearing.”  Id. at 938 (quotation marks omitted).  The Court 
also emphasized the fact that “the relief [Chadha sought was] 
plainly inconsistent with the deportation order.”  Id. at 939. 
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The decisions in Chadha, Foti, Nnadika, and 
Bonhometre persuade us to conclude that the term “order of 
removal” as used in § 1252(a)(5) was intended to include the 
claims Verde raises here.  Verde does not challenge the 
existence of his removal order, but alleges errors “on which 
the validity of the final order [are] contingent,” and the relief 
he seeks would clearly be inconsistent with the order of 
removal.  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 938.  The opposite result 
would thwart Congress’s goal in passing the REAL ID Act, 
which was to “streamline . . . uncertain and piecemeal review 
of orders of removal, divided between the district courts 
(habeas corpus) and the courts of appeals (petitions for 
review).”  Bonhometre, 414 F.3d at 446.  As we explained in 
Kolkevich, “[b]y placing all review in the courts of appeals, 
[the REAL ID Act] provide[s] an adequate and effective 
alternative to habeas corpus.”  501 F.3d at 335 (quotation 
marks omitted).  This result does not undermine our holding 
in Kumarasamy or other cases in which a petitioner seeks to 
file a habeas petition based on something other than an order 
of removal.  Unlike those cases, Verde’s claims concerning 
the process afforded to him at his removal hearing directly 
challenge the lawfulness of the removal order and are 
intertwined with the IJ’s decision to such an extent that we 
must conclude he challenges his order of removal.  
Consequently, we have no jurisdiction to review his habeas 
petition because of the limitations contained in § 1252(a)(5). 
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Verde’s 
petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
